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Caliphal imperialism and Ḥijāzī elites in the second/eighth century 
 
Harry Munt 
University of York 
 
In 129/747, during the reign of the last Umayyad caliph Marwān b. Muḥammad (r. 127Ð
132/744Ð749), a Kharijite rebel called Abū Ḥamza al-Mukhtār b. ʿAwf advanced on Mecca 
during the hajj season. The Umayyad governor, ʿAbd al-Wāḥid b. Sulaymān, abandoned 
both the town and the pilgrims. In Medina, the governor of the Ḥijāz, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. ʿAbd 
Allāh, managed to cobble together an army drawn from locals and set out to confront the 
rebels. They met at a location near the Red Sea called Qudayd in 130/747 and Abū ḤamzaÕs 
force was victorious; the Medinan army was massacred.1 That the Medinans lost this 
particular fight is not necessarily surprising; what is surprising is the identity of many of 
those killed there fighting on behalf of the Umayyad caliphs. This is a time when Umayyad 
rule was under threat on many different fronts. Abū ḤamzaÕs revolt against their caliphate 
was by no means the only one. A descendant of Jaʿfar b. Abī Ṭālib, ʿAbd Allāh b. Muʿāwiya, 
rebelled in Kufa in 127/744 and controlled much of Iran before his final defeat in 130/747Ð
748.2 Abū Muslim famously raised the black banners in revolt in Merv in 130/747, signalling 
the start of what has come to be known as the ʿAbbāsid revolution and the overthrow of 
Marwān b. Muḥammad, the last of the Umayyad caliphs in the Middle East. Yet many of the 
Medinans who died fighting on the side of the Umayyads at Qudayd came from familiesÑ
especially the ZubayridsÑwho had not very long before presented their own serious 
challenges to the UmayyadsÕ monopoly of the caliphal office. What might have inspired this 
seemingly new-found loyalty? 
 
This question, of course, invites further discussion of the dynamics in the relationships 
between the imperial centres of Umayyad Damascus and ʿAbbāsid Baghdad, on the one 
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1 The principal sources for this battle are Khalīfa b. Khayyāṭ, Taʾrīkh, ed. Akram Ḍiyāʾ al-ʿUmarī (Baghdad: 
Maṭbaʿat al-ʿĀnī, 1387/1967), pp. 391Ð5; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-ashrāf, ed. Maḥmūd Firdaws al-ʿAẓm (Damascus: 
Dār al-Yaqẓa al-ʿArabiyya, 1997Ð2004, 25 volumes), VII: 629Ð34; al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, ed. M.Th. Houtsma, Ibn-
Wādhih qui dicitur al-Jaʿqubī Historiae (Leiden: Brill, 1883, 2 volumes), II: 406; al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh al-rusul wa-l-
mulūk, eds. M.J. de Goeje et al., Annales quos scripsit Abu Djafar Mohammed ibn Djarir at-Tabari (Leiden: Brill, 1879Ð
1901, 3 parts in 15 volumes), II: 2006Ð15; al-Azdī, Taʾrīkh al-Mawṣil, ed. ʿAlī Ḥabība (Cairo: al-Majlis al-Aʿlā li-l-
Shuʾūn al-Islāmiyya, 1387/1967), pp. 108Ð10. 
2 Teresa Bernheimer, ÒThe Revolt of ʿAbdallāh b. Muʿāwiya, AH 127Ð130: A Reconsideration through the 
CoinageÓ, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 69/3 (2006): 381Ð93. 
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hand, and the empireÕs provincial elites on the other. For whatever else they may have 
been, the UmayyadÑat least in the Marwānid periodÑand early ʿAbbāsid caliphsÑbefore 
things began to go wrong from the late third/ninth centuryÑwere rulers of an empire, Òthe 
geopolitical manifestation of relationships of control imposed by a state on the sovereignty 
of othersÓ. It is, therefore, useful to view such relationships between the caliphs and 
provincial elites as a manifestation of imperialism, Òboth the process and attitudes by 
which an empire is established and maintainedÓ.3 A number of modern studies have made 
great headway in this effort.4 Yet we are still someway from a critical mass of scholarship 
on the early Islamic Òimperial rationaleÓ, the continual processes of negotiation defining 
the respective duties, responsibilities and rights of the central imperial/caliphal 
administrations and the provincial elites. This article will focus on how one regionÕs elites 
interacted with the caliphal administrations over the second/eighth century to see what 
that can add to our understanding of the nature, and success or otherwise, of Umayyad and 
early ʿAbbāsid imperialism. 
 
The Ḥijāzī elites are an important group to study in this respect. They were, for the most 
part, descendants of the original founders of the Islamic empire, whose ancestors had first 
established the Muslim community in western Arabia and then overseen its spectacular 
expansion out of the peninsula. Their history after the first, or sometimes the second, fitna 
has often been unfairly relegated in modern scholarship to political insignificance, but 
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3 The definitions come from David J. Mattingly, Imperialism, Power, and Identity: Experiencing the Roman 
Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), p. 6. 
4 For some examples of wide-ranging studies, see Patricia Crone, Slaves on Horses: The Evolution of the Islamic 
Polity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Hugh Kennedy, ÒCentral Government and Provincial 
lites in the Early ʿAbbāsid CaliphateÓ, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 44/1 (1981): 26Ð38; 
idem, ÒThe Decline and Fall of the First Muslim EmpireÓ, Der Islam 81/1 (2004): 3Ð30. There are also some 
particularly interesting thoughts in Chris Wickham, ÒTributary Empires: Late Rome and the Arab CaliphateÓ, 
in Tributary Empires in Global History, eds. Peter Fibiger Bang and Christopher A. Bayly (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011), pp. 205Ð13. For interesting works with a specific regional focus, see Paul M. Cobb, White 
Banners: Contention in ʿAbbāsid Syria, 750-880 (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001); Elton 
Daniel, The Political and Social History of Khurasan under Abbasid Rule, 747-820 (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 
1979); Hugh Kennedy, ÒEgypt as a Province in the Islamic Caliphate, 641Ð868Ó, in The Cambridge History of Egypt, 
Volume One: Islamic Egypt, 640Ð1517, ed. Carl F. Petry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 62Ð85; 
Jacob Lassner, ÒProvincial Administration under the Early ʿAbbāsids: Abū Jaʿfar al-Manṣūr and the Governors 
of the ḤaramaynÓ, Studia Islamica 49 (1979): 39Ð54; idem, ÒProvincial Administration under the Early ʿAbbāsids: 
The Ruling Family and the Amṣār of IraqÓ, Studia Islamica 50 (1979): 21Ð35; Chase F. Robinson, Òal-ʿAṭṭāf b. 
Sufyān and Abbasid ImperialismÓ, in Essays in Islamic Philology, History, and Philosophy, eds. Alireza Korangy, 
Wheeler M. Thackston, Roy P. Mottahedeh and William Granara (Berlin: De Gruyter, forthcoming [2016]); 
idem, Empire and Elites after the Muslim Conquest: The Transformation of Northern Mesopotamia (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000); Petra M. Sijpesteijn, Shaping a Muslim State: The World of a mid-Eighth-Century 
Egyptian Official (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
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there is plenty of room to resist this interpretation.5 They were members of families with 
good early Islamic credentials which had provided and continued to provide alternative 
claimants to the caliphate, and so the history of their interaction with the Umayyad and 
ʿAbbāsid rulers during a century in which rebellions against their claims to the caliphate 
were frequent is a very important part of the story of early Islamic caliphal imperialism. In 
a relatively recent book, based primarily on the study of genealogical works, Asad Ahmed 
has done fantastic work in examining the political fortunes of five Ḥijāzī elite families over 
the first/seventh to third/ninth centuries, demonstrating in particular how they made use 
of marriage alliances to further their positions and increase their access to patronage.6 In 
this article I want to take a slightly different approach and focus more directly upon the 
actions of these elite families when violent revolts offered them an opportunity to express 
more directly their grievances with the central caliphal regimes. Taking a perspective 
across the second/eighth century also allows us to compare the relative effectiveness of 
late Umayyad and early ʿAbbāsid policies aimed at ensuring the loyalty of provincial elites. 
 
The Òimperial rationaleÓ and provincial elites 
 
All imperial administrations, of course, make demands on their provincial subjects. For the 
most part, these demands are not particularly complicated. The most obvious demand that 
Umayyad and ʿAbbāsid caliphs made of their subjects was the payment of taxes, either in 
kind or in coin, or sometimes a mixture of the two. The tax burden was certainly not 
shared equally among all the empireÕs subjectsÑthe burden was usually heavier on non-
Muslims and there were also distinctions between Muslims as wellÑbut, broadly speaking, 
there are two particularly commonly encountered types of regular taxation: poll taxes and 
land taxes. There was also a variety of each of these types; land taxes, for example, were 
collected in both coin and in kind, and different rates applied to the produce of different 
categories of land.7 Taxes were also collected at least occasionally from (semi-)nomadic 
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5 For a more thorough justification of my thoughts on this issue, see Harry Munt, The Holy City of Medina: 
Sacred Space in Early Islamic Arabia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 151Ð9. 
6 Asad Q. Ahmed, The Religious Elite of the Early Islamic Hijaz: Five Prosopographical Case Studies (Oxford: Unit 
for Prosopographical Research, Linacre College, 2011). The families studied are the descendants of Saʿd b. Abī 
Waqqāṣ (d. ca. 55/674Ð675), ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAwf (d. ca. 31/651Ð652), Ṭalḥa b. ʿUbayd Allāh (d. 36/656), 
ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān (d. 35/656) and ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib (d. 40/661). 
7 For two recent discussions of the complicated early history these taxes, based on rather different 
sources, see Marie A.L. Legendre and Khaled Younes, ÒThe Use of Terms ǧizya and ḫarāǧ in the First 200 Years 
of Hiǧra in EgyptÓ, http://hum.leiden.edu/lias/formation-of-islam/topics-state/study.html [2012; accessed 25 
April 2014]; Michele Campopiano, ÒLÕadministration des impts en Irak et Iran de la fin de lÕpoque Sassanide 
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groups, but how regularly and on what basis are not often clear. We hear anecdotally, for 
example, that one Abū Bakr b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Muḥammad b. Abī Sabra (d. 162/778Ð779) was 
in charge of collecting taxes (variously referred to in Arabic as ṣadaqa, jibāya and masʿāh) 
from the Arabian tribes of Asad and Ṭayyiʾ. 8  Alongside taxation, the caliphal 
administrations would often require levies of soldiers and labourers from among their 
provincial subjects, the former more commonly were Muslims and the latter non-Muslims. 
Papyri from Umayyad Egypt, for example, refer to demands of forced labour and service for 
a range of projects from the maintenance of local irrigation canals, to service in the fleet, to 
the construction of imperial monuments in Syria.9 Military recruitment for the caliphal 
armies varied from time to time and place to place, but local ad hoc levies were not 
unheard of; when the Umayyad caliph Hishām b. ʿAbd al-Malik (r. 105Ð125/724Ð743) visited 
Medina in 106/725, he levied four thousand men for military service.10 
 
The final essential demand made by caliphs on provincial subjects was that the latter 
acknowledge their sovereignty, authority and right to dispense justice. This is quite a vague 
demand, but in practice it generally entailed accepting the governors and other officials 
they appointed as well as these appointeesÕ decisions and arbitration. If local elites had a 
problem with an officialÕs actions they were to seek redress through the appropriate 
channels. Local elitesÕ refusal to accept the caliphÕs appointments to governorships and 
other posts could be the source or symptom of serious rupture and, occasionally, of violent 
retribution.11 In practice, caliphs and their officials had to act more through processes of 
negotiations, alliances and compromises with the provincial elites than through absolutist 
rule by diktat, but a direct challenge against the office of a caliphal official could easily be 
taken as a challenge against the caliph himself.12 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 la crise du califat Abbaside (VIeÐXe sicles)Ó, in Lo que vino de Oriente: horizontes, praxis y dimensin material de los 
sistemas de dominacin fiscal en al-Andalus (ss. VIIÐIX), eds. Xavier Ballestin and Ernesto Pastor (Oxford: 
Archaeopress, 2013), pp. 17Ð27. 
8 Muṣʿab al-Zubayrī, Kitāb Nasab Quraysh, ed. E. Levi-Provenal (Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1953), pp. 428Ð9; al-
Balādhurī, Ansāb al-ashrāf, volume 2, ed. Wilferd Madelung (Beirut: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2003), p. 524; al-
Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III: 265, 268. 
9 For example, within H.I. Bell, ÒTranslations of the Greek Aphrodito Papyri in the British MuseumÓ, Der 
Islam 2 (1911): 269Ð83, 372Ð84; 3 (1912): 132Ð40, 369Ð73; 4 (1913): 87Ð96; 17 (1928): 4Ð8; Clive Foss, ÒEgypt under 
Muʿāwiya, Part I: Flavius Papas and Upper EgyptÓ, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 72/1 (2009): 
1Ð24, p. 16. 
10 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, II: 1472. 
11 Robinson, Empire and Elites, pp. 136, 162. 
12 Cobb, White Banners, pp. 11, 14Ð19; Kennedy, ÒCentral Government and Provincial litesÓ; Mathieu Tillier, 
ÒLegal Knowledge and Local Practices under the Early ʿAbbāsidsÓ, in History and Identity in the Late Antique Near 
East, ed. Philip Wood (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 187Ð204. 
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In return for these demands and exactions, the imperial administration itself had to offer 
something. 13  Perhaps the most obvious benefits that imperial rule conferred upon 
provincial elites were ensuring the stability of vital social, economic and cultural 
institutions (including the minting of coins), dispensing justice equitably and offering 
defence and protection against violent threats. In a recent article, Chase Robinson has 
actually suggested that the latterÑdefence and protection (Ar. ḥimāya)Ñwas perceived by 
provincial elites as the most important benefit that caliphal imperialism offered them. 
When that caliphal ḥimāya was no longer perceived to be functioning, the imperial 
rationale began to be challenged.14 Robinson cites a rather telling passage taken from al-
AzdīÕs (d. 334/946) history of Mosul, under the year 195/810Ð811: 
 
When caliphal authority (al-sulṭān) weakened, and the protection (al-ḥimāya) [it afforded] 
diminished, the people of Mosul rallied around ʿAlī b. al-Ḥasan al-Hamdānī (a local chieftain) so 
that he would take control of the region and protect its sub-districts. From this time until the 
passing of the Banū al-Ḥasan, they would let enter [into the city] a caliphally appointed 
governor (al-wālī min wulāt al-sulṭān) only if they found him satisfactory, their being in effective 
control all the while.15 
 
At least from al-AzdīÕs early-to-mid fourth-/tenth-century perspective, the matter is clear: 
the caliphs could no longer guarantee security for MosulÕs elites, so they no longer felt 
obliged to acknowledge the authority of their appointed officials. Caliphs understandably, 
therefore, were interested in having the prestige of their ḥimāya extolled for all to hear. 
The poet Marwān b. Abī Ḥafṣa (d. ca. 181/797Ð798), for example, in the middle of a 
panegyric for the ʿAbbāsid caliph Muḥammad al-Mahdī (r. 158Ð169/775Ð785), proclaimed 
that: 
 
He protects (aḥmā) the lands of the Muslims against [their enemies], 
 the lowlands and mountains of whose territory he opens up for plunder.16 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 For a good general discussion of this issue, see John F. Haldon, ÔPre-Industrial States and the Distribution 
of Resources: The Nature of the ProblemÕ, in The Byzantine and Early Islamic Near East, III: States, Resources and 
Armies, ed. Averil Cameron (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1995), pp. 1Ð25. 
14 Robinson, Òal-ʿAṭṭāf ibn SufyānÓ. 
15 The translation is RobinsonÕs; for the text, see al-Azdī, Taʾrīkh al-Mawṣil, p. 324. 
16 Marwān b. Abī Ḥafṣa, Dīwān Marwān b. Abī Ḥafṣa, ed. Ashraf Aḥmad ʿAdra (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 
1414/1993), p. 107 (no. 61, line 29). 
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Many other panegyrics for Umayyad and ʿAbbāsid caliphs make the same point, sometimes 
at length, as in the famous Ôvictory odesÕ of al-Akhṭal (d. before 92/710Ð711) for ʿAbd al-
Malik (r. 65Ð86/685Ð705) and Abū Tammām (d. ca. 231/845Ð846) for Abū Isḥāq al-Muʿtaṣim 
(r. 218Ð227/833Ð842).17 
 
So protection and the maintenance of social stability was a key service provincial elites 
expected imperial officials to provide in return for their loyalty and meeting the tax and 
conscription demands. A second provincial expectation would seem to have been that the 
caliphal government fund and carry out vital local infrastructural projects, including 
investment in roads, congregational mosques, irrigation works and the such. Closely linked 
to this, of course, was the hope of many local notables that as much as possible of the tax 
revenues raised in their province would actually be spent within the province. There was 
an acknowledgementÑparticularly in the richer provincesÑof the necessity of some local 
revenues being redistributed to the caliphal centre, but for many the caliphal 
administration in the provinces was seen as an effective way of organising the collection 
and local expenditure of provincial revenues. This expectationÑthat as much revenue as 
possible stay within the provinceÑwas presumably helped by the practical difficulties for 
caliphs and their administrators that regularly transporting enormous quantities of coin 
from one province to the capital would have presented.18 Revenues from the Jazīra and the 
Sawād would have been easy enough to bring to ʿAbbāsid Baghdad via the Euphrates and 
the Tigris, but how much Transoxanian or Khurasanian revenue actually made its way to 
Iraq seems, with the current state of research, to be anyoneÕs guess.19 
 
Some local elites would, naturally enough, have seen in the imperial administration an 
opportunity to improve their own status and lot in life; the caliphal government did make 
demands, but at the same time it offered an opportunity for some for advantageous 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Suzanne Pinckney Stetkevych, The Poetics of Islamic Legitimacy: Myth, Gender, and Ceremony in the Classical 
Arabic Ode (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2002), pp. 80Ð109, 144Ð79. For some further discussion 
of the poetic trope of caliphal protection, see Rajaa Nadler, ÒDie Umayyadenkalifen im Spiegel ihrer 
zeitgenssischen DichterÓ, Inaugural-Dissertation, Friedrich-Alexander Universitt, Erlangen-Nrnberg 
(1990), esp. pp. 16Ð17, 171Ð9. 
18 For some discussion of this questionÑthe extent to which provincial tax revenues were actually 
redistributed to the imperial centreÑwith regards to the Roman empire, see Fergus Millar, ÒCash 
Distributions in Rome and Imperial MintingÓ, in his Rome, the Greek World, and the East, Volume 2: Government, 
Society, and Culture in the Roman Empire, eds. Hannah M. Cotton and Guy M. Rogers (Chapel Hill, NC: University 
of North Carolina Press, 2004), pp. 89Ð104. 
19 For anecdotal evidence that in the mid-third/ninth century caravans did transport revenues from Egypt 
to Iraq via Palestine, see Cobb, White Banners, pp. 12, 39. 
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employment and closer access to power. Just as a poet such as the aforementioned Marwān 
b. Abī Ḥafṣa could use the caliphal court to move on from an early life of relative obscurity 
in al-Yamāma, so too did the Umayyad and, especially, the ʿAbbāsid bureaucraciesÑboth in 
Damascus/Baghdad and the provincial capitalsÑoffer educated notables from across the 
caliphate an opportunity to advance their social standing and increase their wealth.20 This 
also brings us to the obvious point that those provincials who did join the administration 
and the caliphal army expected the imperial centre to ensure that they were paid in a 
timely fashion and rewarded, when appropriate, with land grants.21 
 
Finally, caliphal courtiers and certain theorists of political thought made the case that 
caliphs, as the imāms of the Muslim community, were necessary for the prosperity of that 
community as well as the salvation of each and every member of it.22 It was GodÕs caliph 
ʿAbd al-Malik, according to poets such as al-Akhṭal, Òthrough whom men pray for rainÓ.23 It 
is impossible to work out how many provincial Muslims of the firstÐthird/seventhÐninth 
centuries gave any practical credence to these claims, but we should assume that some did 
at least. We can end this summary of the Umayyad and ʿAbbāsid imperial rationale by 
noting that there are some explicit acknowledgements of its existence in the sources of the 
period. The early ʿAbbāsid Iraqi historian Abū Mikhnaf (d. 157/773Ð774), for example, had 
the caliph ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib (r. 35Ð40/656Ð661) exhort his followers: 
 
There are duties (ḥaqq) that you owe me and duties that I owe you. The duties that I owe you are 
counsel for as long as I am with you; multiplying for you your revenues (fayʾ), teaching you so 
you are no longer ignorant and educating you so that you can learn. The duties that you owe me 
are honest adherence to the oath of allegiance (al-wafāʾ bi-l-bayʿa), private and public counsel, 
responding when I summon you and obedience when I issue commands to you.24 
 
The above discussion has undoubtedly given too synchronic a picture of the early Islamic 
imperial rationale. It should be obvious enough that there were actually a number of 
important developments over the period under discussion. There was continual fluctuation 
in which elite groups and families had access to caliphal patronage. There was also 
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20 On the life of Ibn Abī Ḥafṣa, see, Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt al-aʿyān wa-anbāʾ abnāʾ al-zamān, ed. Iḥsān ʿAbbās 
(Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1397/1977, 8 volumes), V: 189Ð93. 
21 On the payment of the military in the early Islamic centuries, see Hugh Kennedy, The Armies of the 
Caliphs: Military and Society in the Early Islamic State (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 59Ð95. 
22 Patricia Crone, Medieval Islamic Political Thought (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), pp. 21Ð3. 
23 Stetkevych, Poetics of Islamic Legitimacy, pp. 91/294. 
24 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, I: 3387. 
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significant chronological and geographical variation in levels of taxation and the efficiency 
with which it was collected, whether it was to be collected in coin or in kind, and the extent 
to which revenues were spent locally or redistributed elsewhere. The early ʿAbbāsid period 
comes across in the sources as an era in which caliphal exactions came to be perceived by 
Muslims as well as non-Muslims as particularly harsh and modern scholars have indicated 
that this is because early ʿAbbāsid caliphs did indeed try harder than their Umayyad 
predecessors to take more revenue in coin from more people and to redistribute more of it 
to Iraq.25 Provincial elitesÕ concerns in this period are encapsulated in a well-known and 
somewhat melodramatic section from the late second-/eighth-century Syriac Chronicle of 
Zuqnīn about the Òyears of afflictionÓ that accompanied the governorship in the Jazīra of 
Mūsā b. Muṣʿab in the years 1084 AG/772Ð773 CE and 1085 AG/773Ð774 CE.26 In general, 
however, in spite of these developments, over the second/eighth century we see an empire 
demanding taxes and loyalty/obedience alongside provincial elites hoping for protection 
and opportunities to further enhance their social authority and economic security. 
 
The identity of the provincial elites is another category that could vary considerably from 
place to place and time to time. Even in the same place at the same time, provincial elites 
were hardly a homogenous group. There were military and civilian elites, Muslim and non-
Muslim elites, tribal and non-tribal elites, and more besides. Even within these more 
specific groups, experiences and fortunes could differ dramatically.27 The Ḥijāzī elites who 
will be the focus of this article were Muslim and urban, mostly resident in Medina, the 
principal administrative and economic centre of the second-/eighth-century Ḥijāz. There 
were non-Muslim communities in the northern Ḥijāz in this period, as well of course as 
non-urban elites among the (semi-)nomadic populations of western Arabia, but they will 
not feature much in this discussion. The Muslim, urban elites who will be the focus of what 
follows, were broadly split into two categories. On the one hand, there were the 
descendants of the early Meccan converts to Islam (the muhājirūn) and the great Meccan 
families who reportedly dominated the town socially and politically before it fell to 
Muḥammad in 8/630. On the other, there were the descendants of the Medinans (the anṣār) 
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25 Robinson, Empire and Elites, p. 157; Wickham, ÒTributary empiresÓ, pp. 210Ð13. 
26 Chronicle of Zuqnīn, volume 2, ed. J.-B. Chabot, Incerti auctoris Chronicon pseudo-Dionysianum vulgo dictum, II 
(Paris: E Typographeo Reipublicae, 1933), pp. 289Ð373; trans. Amir Harrak, The Chronicle of Zuqnīn, Parts III and 
IV: A.D. 488Ð775 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1999), pp. 253Ð316. 
27 For just one example, the varying fortunes of the caliphateÕs Christian elites in the transition from 
Umayyad to ʿAbbāsid rule, see Philip Wood, ÒChristian Authority under the Early Abbasids: The Life of Timothy 
of KakushtaÓ, Proche-Orient Chrtien 61 (2011): 258Ð74. 
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who offered Muḥammad protection and support at the time of the hijra in 1/622. Although 
the discussion will centre around elites living in Medina, it is actually the originally Meccan 
families who were more successful than their Medinan counterparts in acquiring the 
quantities of land and wealth that sustained membership of the local elite. 
 
The revolts 
 
There were four noteworthy revolts in the second-/eighth-century Ḥijāz, all telescoped 
into a forty-year period in the middle of the century. After the Umayyads finally defeated 
and killed the rival caliphal claimant ʿAbd Allāh b. al-Zubayr in Mecca in 73/692, the Ḥijāz 
was a relatively stable province for over half a century. The next serious threat to Umayyad 
rule in the Ḥijāz was actually caused by an external invasion, but since the Ḥijāzī elitesÕ 
reaction to this threat is so interesting it is worth considering here. This invasion of the 
Ḥijāz, which resulted in the brief conquest of Mecca and Medina in 129Ð130/747, was led by 
Abū Ḥamza al-Mukhtār b. ʿAwf al-Khazrajī. Abū Ḥamza was apparently a regular anti-
Marwānid preacher in Mecca during the hajj season, but met with very little success there 
before the Ḥaḍramī Kharijite rebel ʿAbd Allāh b. Yaḥyā, known as Ṭālib al-Ḥaqq, ÒSeeker of 
TruthÓ, heard him and, recognising a kindred spirit, invited Abū Ḥamza to accompany him 
back to Ḥaḍramawt in 128/745Ð746. There, Abū Ḥamza gave allegiance to ʿAbd Allāh b. 
Yaḥyā as imām and swiftly led an army against Mecca, which he took without a fight during 
the hajj season of 129Ð130/747.28 
 
As Abū Ḥamza then led his army towards Medina, the governor of the Ḥijāz in that town, 
ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAmr b. ʿUthmān, raised a local army to meet the threat. As 
mentioned at the start of the article, this Medinan army was then massacred by Abū 
ḤamzaÕs in a battle at Qudayd.29 Various lists of those Medinans killed in this battle are 
offered by the sources and it is extremely interesting that a large number of those killed 
belonged to Ḥijāzī elite families, notably Zubayrids, who at other times fiercely opposed the 
Umayyad familyÕs domination of the caliphal office.30 We should not underestimate the fear 
that news of the approach of the Kharijite army no doubt instilled in MedinaÕs inhabitants, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 For an account of the story so far, see al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, II: 1942Ð3, 1981Ð4. 
29 The principal sources for this battle are given in n. 1. 
30 There is still much useful information on the Zubayrid family in Ferdinand Wstenfeld, ÒDie Familie el-
ZubeirÓ, Abhandlungen der kniglichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Gttingen, Hist.-Phil. Classe, 23 (1878): 3Ð
112. 
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but nor should we ignore the fact that, at this time of threat to the UmayyadsÕ control over 
the Ḥijāz by a rival claimant to the caliphal office, the elites of Medina rallied behind the 
reigning caliphÕs cause. They did not decide to use Abū ḤamzaÕs threat as a pretext or 
opportunity to throw off the Umayyad yoke, nor did they merely sit aside to see how it 
played out. 
 
A decade and a half after the successful conclusion of the ʿAbbāsid revolution, the second 
serious revolt broke out in Medina. In 145/762 a local Ḥasanid (one of the two main 
branches of the ʿAlid family), Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh b. al-Ḥasan, who carried the 
messianic titles of al-mahdī and al-nafs al-zakiyya, Òthe Pure SoulÓ, was openly declared as 
caliph in the town.31 In spite of the relative ease with which it was defeated militarily by ʿĪsā 
b. Mūsā, a nephew of the reigning caliph Abū Jaʿfar al-Manṣūr (r. 136Ð158/754Ð775), this 
revoltÑtogether with that of MuḥammadÕs brother, Ibrāhīm, in BasraÑwas a very serious 
challenge to the still young ʿAbbāsid dynasty. Two points are worth highlighting about this 
revolt. Firstly, it is very clear that Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh had universal caliphal 
ambitions. He may have attempted to rally the inhabitants of the Ḥijāz to his cause in part 
by picking up on perceived ʿAbbāsid slights against the status of the Kaʿba,32 but his other 
public pronouncementsÑincluding the sermon he delivered in Medina upon the 
declaration of his revolt as well as his correspondence with his ʿAbbāsid rival, Abū Jaʿfar al-
ManṣūrÑmake it very clear that he saw himself as the rightful imām of all the Muslims, not 
just one group of them.33 The coinage struck by his brother Ibrāhīm in Basra also makes 
similarly universal claims to authority.34 When ʿĪsā b. MūsāÕs army was advancing upon 
Medina, there was actually serious debate among Muḥammad and his supporters about 
whether or not to stay in Medina or beat a strategic retreat to somewhere else; Egypt was a 
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31 The major sources for this revolt are al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-ashrāf 2, pp. 507Ð26; al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, II: 
444Ð5, 450Ð3; al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III: 143Ð265; Abū l-Faraj al-Iṣfahānī, Maqātil al-ṭālibiyyīn, ed. Aḥmad Ṣaqr 
(Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Aʿlamī li-l-Maṭbūʿāt, 1427/2006, 4th edition), pp. 206Ð62. Important secondary 
discussions include Tilman Nagel, ÒEin frher Bericht ber den Aufstand von Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh im 
Jahre 145hÓ, Der Islam 46 (1970): 227Ð62; Amikam Elad, ÒThe Rebellion of Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh b. al-Ḥasan 
(Known as al-Nafs al-Zakīya) in 145/762Ó, in ʿAbbasid Studies: Occasional Papers of the School of ʿAbbasid Studies, 
Cambridge, 6-10 July 2002, ed. James Montgomery (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), pp. 147Ð98; Najam Haider, The Origins 
of the Shīʿa: Identity, Ritual, and Sacred Space in Eighth-Century Kūfa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2011), pp. 201Ð4; Teresa Bernheimer, The ʿAlids: The First Family of Islam, 750-1200 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2013), pp. 4Ð6. 
32 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III: 197. 
33 Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-ashrāf 2, p. 508; al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III: 197, 206, 208Ð15. 
34 Luke Treadwell, ÒQurʾanic Inscriptions on the Coins of the ahl al-bayt from the Second to Fourth Century 
AHÓ,  Journal of Qurʾanic Studies 14/2 (2012): 47Ð71, pp. 58Ð9. 
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popular alternative.35 Muḥammad, who is generally presented in the accounts as a fairly 
poor military strategist, elected against wiser advice to remain in Medina and dig a 
defensive trench to keep the ʿAbbāsids out, as his ancestor, the Prophet Muḥammad, had 
done to keep the Meccan polytheists out of the town. This choice aside, however, there is 
no evidence that he planned to make Medina or Mecca the seat of his caliphate had he 
succeeded in overthrowing the ʿAbbāsids. 
 
Secondly, in spite of these ambitions far broader than merely catering to the desires of 
Ḥijāzī elites, his revolt did pick up serious support from among them.36 At first glance, it is 
actually the lack of support from some significant quarters that comes across as notable: 
one of the foremost Medinan members of the Ḥusaynid branch of the ʿAlid family, Jaʿfar al-
Ṣādiq (d. 148/765), refused to support MuḥammadÕs uprising. Some other Qurashī families 
were also divided between support for Muḥammad and refusal to join his rebellion. In spite 
of those who showed themselves reluctant to join in, however, MuḥammadÕs uprising 
found generally widespread support amongst the ḤijāzÕs elite families. Al-Masʿūdī (d. 
345/956) includes a report claiming that MuḥammadÕs followers could be found among 
Òthe descendants of ʿAlī, Jaʿfar, ʿAqīl, ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb and al-Zubayr b. al-ʿAwwām, 
together with the rest of Quraysh and the descendants of the anṣārÓ.37 Such a sweeping 
assertion is, as we have seen, incorrect, but in its exaggeration it reminds us how unusual 
the widespread support for a Ḥasanid revolt from other Qurashī families appeared to later 
historians. Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq may have been a Ḥusaynid who sat this one out, but many of his 
relatives joined Muḥammad enthusiastically. The most widespread support came from the 
Zubayrid family and the descendants of the second caliph ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb (r. 13Ð
23/634Ð644). Amikam Elad even noted that, ÒThe Zubayrids constituted the main military 
and administrative backbone of the rebellionÓ.38 One Zubayrid in particular, Ibrāhīm b. 
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35 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III: 227Ð8. 
36 The fundamental study so far is Elad, ÒRebellion of Muḥammad b. ʿAbd AllāhÓ, pp. 179Ð85, from which 
the following details are taken unless otherwise noted. A far more thorough investigation by Amikam Elad on 
this revolt has recently been published, but unfortunately I had no access to it before submitting this article: 
The Rebellion of Muhammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyya in 145/762: Ṭālibīs and Early ʿAbbāsīs in Conflict (Leiden: Brill, 2016). 
37 Al-Masʿūdī, Murūj al-dhahab wa-maʿādin al-jawhar, ed. Charles Pellat (Beirut: LÕUniversit Libanaise, 1966Ð
1979, 7 volumes), IV: 145Ð6 (¤2401). 
38 Elad, ÒRebellion of Muḥammad b. ʿAbd AllāhÓ, p. 182. 
!
12 
Muṣʿab, known as Ibn Khuḍayr, was singled out in several sources for his especially 
enthusiastic dedication to Muḥammad b. ʿAbd AllāhÕs cause.39 
 
Just as the ZubayridsÕ involvement in the fighting against Abū ḤamzaÕs invasion of the 
Ḥijāz on behalf of their Umayyad rivals was particularly noteworthy, so too was their even 
more enthusiastic support of this revolt led by one of their great rivals. Hostility between 
the Zubayrids and various branches of the ʿAlid family is clear after the failure of 
Muḥammad b. ʿAbd AllāhÕs revolt. Al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/923) noted that the Zubayrid Bakkār b. 
ʿAbd Allāh (d. 195/810Ð811) Òreally loathed the family of Abū Ṭālib [which included the 
ʿAlids] and used to inform on them to Hārūn [al-Rashīd (r. 170Ð193/786Ð809)], making what 
they did seem as bad as possibleÓ.40 Ibn al-Nadīm (wr. ca. 377/987Ð988) labelled BakkārÕs 
father, ʿAbd Allāh b. Muṣʿab (d. 184/800), who actually seems to have participated in 
MuḥammadÕs revolt, as one of the most evil of men because he was prejudiced against and 
maltreated ʿAlīÕs descendants. 41  That Muḥammad b. ʿAbd AllāhÕs Ḥasanid revolt had 
attracted serious support from such families as the Zubayrids in itself makes it a notable 
episode in early Islamic history. 
 
No sooner had Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh been killed and his rebellion crushed than Medina 
was afflicted by violent uprising again. This revolt, known in the sources as the Òuprising of 
the blacksÓ (wuthūb al-sūdān), comes across a bit peculiarly in the extant narratives. It is not 
discussed as frequently or in nearly as much detail as the other rebellions, but there are 
two principal versions: that of Muṣʿab al-Zubayrī (d. 236/851) and al-Balādhurī (d. ca. 
279/892Ð893)Ñfor whom Muṣʿab was one of the main sourcesÑand that of al-Ṭabarī, whose 
principal source was ʿUmar b. Shabba (d. 262/876).42 There are important differences in the 
details provided across these extant accounts, but the general story is the same. The 
uprising occurred as a direct result of Medina being garrisoned for more-or-less the first 
time, as a consequence of Muḥammad b. ʿAbd AllāhÕs revolt, by a significant military 
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39 Al-Zubayr b. Bakkār, Jamharat nasab Quraysh wa-akhbārihā, ed. Maḥmūd Muḥammad Shākir (Riyadh: Dār 
al-Yamāma, 1419/1999, 2nd edition, 2 volumes), I: 354; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-ashrāf 2, p. 515; al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 
III: 241Ð6, 260. 
40 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III: 616. 
41 Ibn al-Nadīm, Fihrist, ed. Ayman Fuʾād Sayyid (London: Muʾassasat al-Furqān li-l-Turāth al-Islāmī, 
1430/2009, 2 parts in 4 volumes), I/ii: 340. On ʿAbd Allāh b. MuṣʿabÕs participation in the revolt, see Abū l-Faraj, 
Maqātil al-ṭālibiyyīn, p. 251. He was particularly known for the composition of an elegy for Muḥammad b. ʿAbd 
Allāh, for which see al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III: 255Ð6; al-Azdī, Taʾrīkh al-Mawṣil, pp. 191Ð2. 
42 Muṣʿab al-Zubayrī, Nasab Quraysh, pp. 429Ð30; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-ashrāf 2, pp. 525Ð6; al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 
III: 265Ð71. 
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contingent under the command of the new governor, ʿAbd Allāh b. al-Rabīʿ. These ʿAbbāsid 
soldiers made a serious nuisance of themselves by mistreating the townÕs inhabitants; to 
compound the problem, they were being provisioned with seaborne supplies from Syria 
and Egypt at a time when the rest of the ḤijāzÕs inhabitants were under an official import 
embargo, again a result of Muḥammad b. ʿAbd AllāhÕs failed uprising.43 According to al-
ṬabarīÕs more detailed version, in the midst of one dispute, a Medinan trader killed an 
ʿAbbāsid soldier andÑthis is where the narrative takes a strange turnÑthe slaves in 
Medina, led by one Wathīq,44 revolted on behalf of their put-upon masters: ÒBy God, we 
have only risen up out of scorn at what has been done to you. We stand by you and are at 
your disposalÓ.45 According to al-BalādhurīÕs version, the rebels even entitled their leader 
amīr al-muʾminīn, ÒCommander of the FaithfulÓ, the standard title in formal protocol for the 
caliph.46 MedinaÕs elite families were somewhat alarmed by their slavesÕ actions, even if the 
latter had claimed to be acting on their behalf, and tried to urge restraint, fearing further 
ʿAbbāsid reprisals against the town and their families. Among those figures noted as having 
urged loyalty to the ʿAbbāsid caliph and his governor were the Ṭalḥid Muḥammad b. ʿImrān 
b. Ibrāhīm, the ʿAwfid Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. ʿUmar, and even an Umayyad, al-
Aṣbagh b. Sufyān b. ʿĀṣim b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Marwān. Eventually, these wiser heads 
managed to prevail upon the rebels, ʿAbbāsid authority was restored relatively peacefully 
and the leaders of the revolt were imprisoned. 
 
As I said, this narrative as it stands is slightly strange. The background narrative given to 
explain the outbreak of the revolt focuses exclusively upon the interaction of the local 
Medinan free population and the ʿAbbāsid caliphal administration. The Medinans had two 
particular concerns: the poor behaviour of the military garrison and the conduct of Abū 
Jaʿfar al-ManṣūrÕs appointment as governor of the Ḥijāz, ʿAbd Allāh b. al-Rabīʿ al-Ḥārithī. 
Yet those Ḥijāzī elites who felt affronted by this ʿAbbāsid heavy-handedness were not the 
ones to revolt; it was the regionÕs slaves who did so instead. There is, however, some faint 
trace of a suggestion that the Medinans may have tried to use this revolt to their advantage 
to get the caliph to replace Ibn al-Rabīʿ as governor with one of their own, Abū Bakr b. ʿAbd 
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43 On this embargo, see Harry Munt, ÒTrends in the Economic History of the Early Islamic Ḥijāz: Medina 
during the Second/Eighth CenturyÓ, Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 42 (2015): 201Ð47, pp. 209Ð10. 
44 The principal leader of the slaves is named Wathīq in both al-ṬabarīÕs and Muṣʿab al-ZubayrīÕs versions, 
but as Ūtiyū in al-BalādhurīÕs, the latter presumably being a later corruption of the former. 
45 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III: 268. 
46 Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-ashrāf 2, p. 525. 
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Allāh b. Muḥammad b. Abī Sabra (d. 162/778Ð779), a respected scholar whose ancestor Abū 
Sabra was one of the first Meccan emigrants to Medina.47 The ʿAbbāsid caliphs frequently 
took local elitesÕ refusal to acquiesce to their appointees as an instance of serious 
rebellion.48 With this in mind, and coupled with the MedinansÕ own recent experiences of 
the backlash following the failure of a local revolt against al-ManṣūrÕs rule, it would not be 
surprising if the local elites, had they had in mind an attempt to force a replacement 
governor, acted cautiously in doing so. Nor would it be surprising that, in the aftermath of 
their inability to get their man recognised as governor, they quickly attempted to alter the 
record by making the revolt appear simply as a slave rebellion that was restrained by the 
local elitesÕ calming influence. 
 
The final revolt we will deal with was another Ḥasanid rebellion in the Ḥijāz, a quarter of a 
century after Muḥammad b. ʿAbd AllāhÕs. In 169/786, al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī b. al-Ḥasan was 
proclaimed as caliph and imām in the ProphetÕs Mosque in Medina.49 This again was a 
rebellion whose participants were aiming for far more than local significance, although al-
Ḥusayn played heavily upon his geographical location in a sermon in the mosque: ÒI am the 
son of the Messenger of God, in the ḥaram of the Messenger of God, in the mosque of the 
Messenger of God, atop the minbar of the Prophet of GodÓ. It is quite clear, however, that al-
Ḥusayn received virtually no support from the ḤijāzÕs local elites, although he did 
apparently convince some of the pilgrims from other regions to follow his cause.50 He was 
forced to leave Medina for Mecca to try to find further support there among the hajj 
pilgrims, but was easily defeated by an ʿAbbāsid army at a place called Fakhkh, three miles 
outside Mecca, on the first day of the pilgrimage season, 8 Dhū l-Ḥijja 169/11 June 786. 
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47 On Ibn Abī Sabra, see Ibn Saʿd, al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā: al-qism al-mutammim li-tābiʿī ahl al-Madīna wa-man 
baʿdahum (min rubʿ al-ṭabaqa al-thālitha ilā muntaṣaf al-ṭabaqa al-sādisa), ed. Ziyād Muḥammad Manṣūr  (Medina: 
Maktabat al-ʿUlūm wa-al-Ḥikam, 1408/1987), pp. 458Ð9; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-ashrāf, ed. al-ʿAẓm, IX: 269; al-
Mizzī, Tahdhīb al-kamāl fī asmāʾ al-rijāl, ed. Bashshār ʿAwwād Maʿrūf (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1402Ð
1413/1982Ð1992, 35 volumes), XXXIII: 102Ð8. 
48 For two examples concerning Mosul, see n. 11. 
49 Khalīfa b. Khayyāṭ, Taʾrīkh, p. 445; Ibn Saʿd, Ṭabaqāt (qism), pp. 384Ð5; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-ashrāf 2, p. 
540; al-Fasawī, Kitāb al-Maʿrifa wa-l-taʾrīkh, ed. Akram Ḍiyāʾ al-ʿUmarī (Medina: Maktabat al-Dār, 1410/1989-
1990, 3rd edition, 4 volumes), I: 159; al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, II: 448; al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III: 551Ð68; Abū l-Faraj, Maqātil 
al-ṭālibiyyīn, pp. 364Ð85; al-Rāzī, Akhbār Fakhkh wa-khabar Yaḥyā b. ʿAbd Allāh wa-akhīhi Idrīs b. ʿAbd Allāh, ed. 
Maher Jarrar (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1995), pp. 132Ð62; Hugh Kennedy, The Early Abbasid Caliphate: A 
Political History (Beckenham: Croom Helm, 1981), pp. 109Ð10, 205Ð7; Ahmed, Religious Elite, pp. 162Ð3; Haider, 
Origins of the Shīʿa, pp. 207Ð10. 
50 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III: 564; see also Abū l-Faraj, Maqātil al-ṭālibiyyīn, pp. 376Ð7. 
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In his account of Muḥammad b. Jaʿfar al-ṢādiqÕs proclamation as caliph in the Ḥijāz, which 
came in 200/815 following the death of Abū l-Sarāyā, the leader of an ʿAlid revolt in Kufa, 
Abū l-Faraj al-Iṣfahānī (d. 356/967) does suggest that both his claim and al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAlīÕs 
thirty-one years earlier had received general local acceptance in Medina: 
 
During these days, Muḥammad b. Jaʿfar b. Muḥammad made his claim public (ẓahara) in Medina 
and called [for allegiance] to himself. The Medinans gave him the oath of allegiance as 
Commander of the Faithful. After al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī, the Medinans gave the oath of allegiance to 
no one other than Muḥammad b. Jaʿfar b. Muḥammad.51 
 
We should bear in mind, however, that Abū al-Faraj was a partisan author writing an 
apologetic and polemical history on behalf of ʿAlid rebels against Umayyad and ʿAbbāsid 
rule, and other sources suggest that al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī received nothing like widespread 
acceptance as caliph among the Medinans. 
 
ʿAlid revolts continued in the Ḥijāz throughout the third/ninth century, but they 
increasingly took on the appearance of banditry and were certainly not locally popular, 
becoming almost indistinguishable in some ways from the increasing tribal insurrections of 
this period, the illustrious ancestry of their leaders being all that gave them a semblance of 
gravity. In 251/865, for example, the Ḥasanid Ismāʿīl b. Yūsuf b. Ibrāhīm rebelled in Mecca, 
but his rebellion consisted of little more than looting the city, including the Kaʿba, robbing 
pilgrims, killing people, seizing local wealth and then replicating these actions in Medina 
and Jedda.52 Increasingly, the ʿAlids (or, perhaps better, the Ṭālibids) of the Ḥijāz started to 
turn violently against one another.53 In 271/884, two ḤusaynidsÑMuḥammad and ʿAlī, sons 
of al-Ḥusayn b. Jaʿfar b. Mūsā b. Jaʿfar al-ṢādiqÑraided Medina, killed people and extorted 
money from the locals. They seem to have occupied the ProphetÕs Mosque, meaning that no 
prayer took place there, for about four weeks; a poet, perhaps called al-Faḍl b. al-ʿAbbās al-
ʿAlawī (his name changes from one source to the next), recited a lament for the destruction 
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51 Abū al-Faraj, Maqātil al-ṭālibiyyīn, p. 438. According to al-Ṭabarī (Taʾrīkh, III: 989Ð90), Muḥammad b. Jaʿfar 
al-Ṣādiq actually received the oath of allegiance in Mecca. On Abū l-SarāyāÕs revolt, see Kennedy, Early Abbasid 
Caliphate, pp. 152Ð4, 207Ð11. 
52 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III: 1644Ð5. 
53 See the accounts of the strife between various Ṭālibid families in 266/879Ð880 and 269/882Ð883 in al-
Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III: 1941, 2039. 
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this raid inflicted on the townÕs holy sites.54 As might be expected, there is no evidence that 
any of these rebelsÕ actions endeared them or their causes to the local elites.55 
 
Patterns and analysis 
 
The first important trend that can be seen clearly in the history of Ḥijāzī revolts in the 
second/eighth century is that they increase in frequency in the ʿAbbāsid period. This 
conforms well with patterns of revolt in other provinces of the caliphate, including Egypt, 
Syria, the Jazīra, Iran and central Asia.56 To infer from this newfound frequency of 
rebellions that the ʿAbbāsid revolution had ushered in profound changes to the imperial 
rationale would certainly be a plausible suggestion. As Patricia Crone has noted, ÒSome of 
the provincial troubles, of course, were of the type liable to accompany any major transfer 
of powerÉ Others clearly reflect the shift from a loose conquest society to an integrated 
stateÓ.57 The Umayyad caliphs, at least after the second fitna, may actually have done a 
better job of convincing provincial elites in some regions of the benefits of the imperial 
rationale than their early ʿAbbāsid successors. In support of this suggestion, it is worth 
remembering that the one revolt discussed here which fell in the Umayyad period, that led 
by Abū Ḥamza al-Khārijī in 129Ð130/747, was actively fought against by the Medinan elites. 
 
The second important point is that in spite of the increased frequency of revolts in the 
early ʿAbbāsid Ḥijāz, only one of these, Muḥammad b. ʿAbd AllāhÕs in 145/762, received any 
meaningful support from local elites; al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAlīÕs of 169/786 seems to have found no 
significant levels of support at all, and the otherÑthe slave revolt of 145/762Ñis murky, 
although I suggested that the local elites did try to use that revolt for their own ends before 
backtracking quickly when it became obvious it was going nowhere. In any case, in the 
extant record, that revolt received virtually no local elite support. Why then did 
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54 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III: 2105Ð6; al-Marzubānī, Muʿjam al-shuʿarāʾ, ed. Fārūq Aḥmad Asalīm (Beirut: Dār 
Ṣādir1425/2005), pp. 226Ð7; Munt, Holy City of Medina, p. 122. 
55 The question of who exactly supported these new generations of ʿAlid bandits is an intriguing one. 
Clearly Ismāʿīl b. Yūsuf b. Ibrāhīm and the two Ḥusaynids, Muḥammad and ʿAlī, could not have carried out 
their raids without some armed support. Evidence is virtually absent on this question, but it could be 
suggested that their support would have come from the (semi-)nomadic tribes of the region, themselves 
becoming much more restive in this period; on this, see Munt, ÒTrends in the Economic HistoryÓ, pp. 228Ð9. 
56 For some examples, see Cobb, White Banners; Patricia Crone, The Nativist Prophets of Early Islamic Iran: Rural 
Revolt and Local Zoroastrianism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Yaacov Lev, ÒCoptic Rebellions 
and the Islamization of Medieval Egypt (8thÐ10th Century): Medieval and Modern PerceptionsÓ, Jerusalem 
Studies in Arabic and Islam 39 (2012): 303Ð44, pp. 312Ð20; Robinson, Empire and Elites, pp. 127Ð64. 
57 Crone, Slaves on Horses, p. 71. 
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Muḥammad b. ʿAbd AllāhÕs revolt receive considerable support when others did not, and 
what can the possible answers to that question tell us about the attitudes of the second-
/eighth-century Ḥijāzī elites to late Umayyad and early ʿAbbāsid imperialism? 
 
Amikam Elad suggested that widespread non-ʿAlid support for Muḥammad b. ʿAbd AllāhÕs 
revolt was inspired by harsh ʿAbbāsid economic policies in the regionÑespecially the 
confiscation of estatesÑagainst a backdrop of general economic decline in the Ḥijāz.58 
Although such policies would no doubt cause widespread resentment and could bring elites 
in danger of losing out to revolt, it is less clear that they can account for this instance of 
widespread elite participation in a Ḥijāzī rebellion. For one thing, the ʿAbbāsid caliphs 
before 145/762 do not seem to have appropriated land around Medina any more effectively 
than had the Umayyads in the preceding half century.59 Secondly, it is not particularly clear 
that the northern Ḥijāz in general underwent a period of relative economic decline over 
the second/eighth century. Plenty of evidence suggests instead that meaningful economic 
decline only set in from the second half of the third/ninth century, before accelerating 
over the fourth/tenth century.60 The mid-second/eighth century may actually have been a 
relatively prosperous time economically for many of MedinaÕs elites. 
 
Asad Ahmed, on the other hand, convincingly argued for two developments that can help 
us to understand the peak of support for this one rebellion in 145/762.61 The first of these 
relates to marriage patterns: Muḥammad b. ʿAbd AllāhÕs Ḥasanid family had intermarried 
regularly with other Medinan elite families before 145/762, but did so increasingly 
infrequently after the failed revolt.62 This meant that by the time al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī revolted 
in 169/786 the other Medinan families had fewer interests in common with their Ḥasanid 
neighbours. The second development concerns ʿAbbāsid reconciliation policies. As might be 
expected, immediately following ʿĪsā b. MūsāÕs defeat of Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh there was 
a period of heavy repression aimed at those who had supported the rebellion. The Zubayrid 
family historian and genealogist, al-Zubayr b. Bakkār (d. 256/870), reported that Abū Jaʿfar 
al-Manṣūr ordered his cousin and new governor of Medina, Jaʿfar b. Sulaymān b. ʿAlī, to 
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58 Elad, ÒRebellion of Muḥammad b. ʿAbd AllāhÓ, p. 185. 
59 Harry Munt, ÒCaliphal Estates and Properties around Medina in the Umayyad PeriodÓ, in Authority and 
Control in the Countryside: Continuity and Change in the Mediterranean, 6thÐ10th Centuries, eds. Alain Delattre, Marie 
Legendre and Petra M. Sijpesteijn (forthcoming). 
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62 For ʿAlid marriage patterns, see also Bernheimer, ʿAlids, pp. 32Ð50. 
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ÒSeek out those Qurashīs who rebelled with Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh and imprison them. 
Flay the Arabs who rebelled with him and cut the hands off the mawālī who rebelledÓ.63 
 
This era of repression, however, was eventually tempered by more reconciliatory policies 
as the ʿAbbāsid caliphs started to buy off many members of MedinaÕs eliteÑespecially 
Zubayrids and the descendants of ʿUmar b. al-KhaṭṭābÑby offering them governorships and 
judgeships in various provinces. As we have seen, the Zubayrid ʿAbd Allāh b. MuṣʿabÑ
grandfather of al-Zubayr b. BakkārÑparticipated in Muḥammad b. ʿAbd AllāhÕs revolt, but 
was then later appointed governor of al-Yamāma by Muḥammad al-Mahdī and of Medina 
and Yemen by Hārūn al-Rashīd. His son, Bakkār, was also one of HārūnÕs governors of 
Medina. Mūsā l-HādīÕs (r. 169Ð170/785Ð786) governor of Medina at the time of al-Ḥusayn b. 
ʿAlīÕs rebellion was ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. ʿAbd Allāh, a descendant of ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb. 
Abū Jaʿfar al-Manṣūr even appointed a Ḥasanid, al-Ḥasan b. Zayd, governor of Medina from 
150/767Ð768 to 155/771Ð772.64 Incorporating local elite families into the ruling regime in 
this way was presumably calculated to demonstrate to them the benefits of the ʿAbbāsidsÕ 
imperial rationale and so to stop them joining any future revolts; it seems to have been 
quite successful. 
 
Najam Haider has suggested that with al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAlīÕs revolt of 169/786, we can see a 
more distinctly Shīʿī side to the rebels programme, which coincided with diminishing 
support for ʿAlid rebels from non-ʿAlid elites.65 It is not absolutely clear whether one of 
these two developments was the cause of the other, but if the more distinctly Shīʿī side to 
the rebelsÕ programme came first that may have had the effect of discouraging members of 
other elite families from joining the movement. This may explain why as a last throw of the 
dice on the verge of defeat al-Ḥusayn tried to appeal to the support of MeccaÕs slaves 
(ʿabīd); if hopes of gaining any local elite support had been sacrificed in return for 
promoting a more radically Shīʿī message, then agitating for social revolution was a 
plausible if somewhat last ditch alternative.66 This does not, however, particularly help us 
to explain why the earlier revolt of Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh had picked up such a 
considerable array of support from the non-ʿAlid Medinan families. 
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63  Al-Zubayr b. Bakkār, al-Akhbār al-muwaffaqiyyāt, ed. Sāmī Makkī al-ʿĀnī (Beirut: ʿĀlam al-Kutub, 
1416/1996, 2nd edition), p. 163; Elad, ÒRebellion of Muḥammad b. ʿAbd AllāhÓ, p. 184. 
64 For further details and references, see Munt, Holy City of Medina, pp. 155Ð6. 
65 Haider, Origins of the Shīʿa, p. 209. 
66 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III: 556; Kennedy, Early Abbasid Caliphate, p. 206. 
!
19 
 
In large part, then, it seems as though increasingly endogenous Ḥasanid marriage patterns 
and the ʿAbbāsid caliphsÕ targeted conciliatory moves in the aftermath of the revolt of 
145/762 may have made a considerable part of the difference. If we look at the history of 
rebellions in the Ḥijāz across the whole second/eighth century, however, then we can also 
discern one other important element. There is virtually no evidence of any tradition of 
political regionalism among the ḤijāzÕs elite families in the late Umayyad or early ʿAbbāsid 
period. These elites seem to have been totally committed to the ideal of a unified Islamic 
empire. They may have disapproved of individual caliphal office holders, but they did not 
disapprove of caliphal imperialism as a whole. It was, so they asserted of course, their own 
ancestors who had created this empire and both their wealth and concurrent status as 
elites were predicated to a large degree on this assertion; it would have been self-defeating 
in so many ways to respond to Umayyad or ʿAbbāsid imperialism by seeking to break away. 
 
The elites of the Ḥijāz also presumably recognised that they had in many ways a 
significantly better deal in the imperial rationale than the leading families in other 
provinces. In general, the notables of Mecca and Medina seem to have expected much the 
same of the caliphal administration as their counterparts in other provinces. When it came 
to caliphal demands on the region, however, there were important differences. The legal 
theory most commonly had it that Ḥijāzī land could not be taxed at the higher rates 
applicable to much of the agricultural land in other provinces, but rather would pay only 
the lower ʿushr rate.67 This is part of the reason, alongside the relative paucity of good 
agricultural land in the region, why recorded revenues from the Ḥijāz were much lower 
than those of many other provinces.68 Given this fairly low rate of taxation, we might also 
consider it extremely unlikely that a noticeable portion of the revenues raised from direct 
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taxation of the Ḥijāzī elites was sent to the caliphal centre.69 It was not a province that had 
to support a long-term military presence, but the infrastructural demands of the regionÕs 
sacred sites and pilgrim routesÑwhich caliphs from the Marwānid period onwards 
generally liked to be seen to be patronising70Ñwere reasonably intensive and would have 
been an obvious use for the locally-raised revenue. 
 
Ḥijāzī elites realised they actually had quite a good deal out of the Islamic empire and so 
their opposition to individual caliphs did not lead to provincialism, a desire to break away 
from the empire to form a distinct political entity. Actions similar to those followed by al-
AndalusÕs elites under the leadership of the Umayyad amīr ʿAbd al-Raḥmān (I) b. Muʿāwiya 
(r. 138Ð172/756Ð788) after the ʿAbbāsid revolution did not appeal to most of the ḤijāzÕs 
important families. Their opposition to particular caliphs and dynasties, however, could be 
channelled into supporting an alternative candidate who looked like he might actually 
have a chance of successfully overthrowing the reigning caliph and taking control of the 
whole empire. 
 
The one best chance at this came with the rebellion of Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh Òal-Nafs al-
ZakiyyaÓ in 145/762. This revolt came only twelve years after the conclusion of the ʿAbbāsid 
revolution, before the new dynasty was securely established. This was a time when Muslim 
elites across the Islamic world had far from unanimously accepted ʿAbbāsid governance as 
necessarily given, and the opportunity for garnering widespread, trans-regional support 
for an alternative candidate from the ProphetÕs family would have appeared likely.71 Again, 
it is worth reiterating that the fact that the revolt was easily suppressed ultimately should 
not detract from its seriousness at the time, especially in conjunction with the uprising of 
MuḥammadÕs brother, Ibrāhīm, in Basra. Many members of MedinaÕs top families were 
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willing to take the risk of supporting a local candidate for the caliphate, one who they 
presumably expected to be more sympathetic to their concerns when in office, when they 
thought there was a chance he could succeed. They were not, however, willing to take that 
risk with the other rebelsÑAbū Ḥamza al-Khārijī and al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī in particularÑwho 
had far less chance of capturing the caliphate but presented a significant risk that the Ḥijāz 
might be broken away from the empire within which their prosperity and power were 
based. Individual caliphs and caliphal families may have been loathed in the towns of the 
Ḥijāz, but on the whole their rule benefitted the local elites far more than increasing 
provincial independence would have done. 
 
In general, the project of caliphal imperialism was a great success in the Ḥijāz, perhaps 
more so than in many other provinces of the caliphate. It has long been recognised by 
modern historians that, after some difficulties in the early years of their rule, the ʿAbbāsids 
were relatively quick to realise the importance of viewing their relationships with 
provincial elites across the caliphate as one of negotiation rather than imposition.72 This 
certainly seems to have been the case in the Ḥijāz from shortly after 145/762. The history 
of Ḥijāzī revolts over the second/eighth century also suggests, however, that after the 
defeat of Ibn al-Zubayr in 73/692 the Umayyads were no less successful in convincing the 
elites of that province of the benefits of their imperialism. There were no locally inspired 
rebellions in the Ḥijāz against Umayyad rule in the half century between the second fitna 
and the ʿAbbāsid revolutionÑwhich is quite remarkable when you compare that to the 
relatively frequent episodes of opposition they encountered in some other provincesÑand, 
when an external revolt did come to Mecca and Medina, their inhabitants actively fought 
with the Umayyad ruling authorities against it. This may have been a Kharijite revolt and 
one originating in another province, but it is noteworthy that in this case the local elites of 
the Ḥijāz were convinced that the deal they had with the Umayyads was one so much 
better that it was worth fighting and, ultimately for many of them, dying to defend. In the 
history of the Ḥijāz, as with several other provinces, it was actually the onset of ʿAbbāsid 
rule that ushered in an era of relative instability. 
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